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I. INTRODUCTION 
Much of the Hecla's1 response brief hinges on a single argument: that the 
mere invocation of "I did not mean to hurt that employee" is a panacea for all 
occupational-injury claims, no matter how egregious an employer's conduct. 
However, caselaw and the facts of this action brought by the Mareks2 demonstrate 
otherwise, as discussed below. 
In summary, the two Idaho decisions relied upon by Hecla - Kearney3 and 
DeMoss4 - simply reflect that the exclusivity-exception to Idaho's workers' 
compensation laws (LC. §72-209(3)) does not apply to negligent conduct. However, 
Justice Huntley's prescient concurrence in Kearney (citing, in part, the 
Restatement) foreshadowed that dangerous conduct beyond mere negligence would 
invoke the exclusivity-exception. 
The Dominguez case5 reflected just such a scenario foreseen by Justice 
Huntley: the "knowing ordering of an employee into an unsafe working 
environment" - that is, conduct beyond mere negligence. Hecla complains that 
Dominguez was decided by default, but even defaults must be predicated on valid 
1 In this brief, "Hecla," collectively, is defendants-respondents Hecla Limited, Hecla 
Mining Company, Silver Hunter Mining Company, Phillip S. Baker, Jr., John 
Jordan, Doug Bayer, Scott Hogamier, Cindy Moore, and Dale Stepro. 
2 In this brief, "the Mareks" are plaintiffs-appellants Patricia Marek, Michael 
Marek, Jodie Marek, and Hayley Marek. 
3 Kearney v. Denker, 114 Idaho 755, 760 P.2d 1171 (1988). 
4 DeMoss v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 118 Idaho 176, 795 P.2d 875 (1990). 
5 Dominguez v. Evergreen Resources, 142 Idaho 7, 121 P.3d 938 (2005). 
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legal theories. Further, the facts presented by the Mareks amply demonstrate that 
the danger created by Hecla squarely fits within the scope of conduct that allows 
the exclusivity-exception to apply. This is further borne out by the admissible 
findings of the federal Mine Safety and Health Administration ("MSHA"). The 
counter-facts offered by Hecla in its response are otherwise incomplete and/or 
in~ccurate, and, at a minimum, represent disputed facts, precluding summary 
judgment in Heda's favor. 
The Mareks' case does not, as Hecla suggest, break any new ground, or lead 
employers/employees into some undiscovered country ripe for litigation chaos. The 
District of Idaho - as recently as three weeks ago - issued a decision in a factually 
similar case, denying an employer's motion to dismiss asserting workers' 
compensation exclusivity. Braase v. Battelle Energy All., LLC, No. 4:14-CV-00481-
EJL, 2016 WL 676358 (D. Idaho Feb. 18, 2016)(J. Lodge). 
Further, West Virginia another state with mining as a key industry -
previously rejected the kind of 'specific intent' argument advanced by Hecla, 
allowing for 'Mandolidis actions.' Those actions allowed suits like the Mareks' 
action, and were premised on the fundamental principle that workers' compensation 
was designed to preclude litigation on negligent conduct only. 
Here, the District Court's overly narrow reading of Kearney and DeMoss is in 
error, as Idaho's workers' compensation scheme is not an invitation for employers to 
place employees in deathtraps with impunity. Instead, the Legislature built a 
figurative escape hatch in the workers' compensation laws for employees whose 
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employers failed to provide a literal one - the exclusivity-exception. 
The Mareks' action appropriately fits within that exclusivity-exception, as 
discussed below, and the District Court's decision granting summary judgment to 
Hecla should be reversed. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. The new Braase decision in the District of Idaho. 
During the pendency of the briefing of this appeal, the District of Idaho 
issued a decision in Braase v. Battelle Energy All., LLC, 2016 WL 676358, 
examining the workers' compensation exclusivity-exception for willful aggression. 
The U.S. District Court's ruling tracks the Mareks' arguments in this appeal, and 
pr<)Vide further support for the Mareks' position on appeal. 
In Braase, an employee of Battelle Energy Alliance (Battelle) at the INL, 
"was exposed to radioactive dust while repackaging radioactive fuel plates during 
the course of his employment." Id. at *l. The employee's claims were brought 
under the Price-Anderson Act and Idaho state laws. Id. Battelle moved to dismiss 
the action, asserting that the employee's claims fell under the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the Idaho Worker's Compensation Act. Id. 
The U.S. District Court denied the motion, finding that the "Complaint has, 
at-least at this stage, alleged facts which may give rise to the application of the 
exception to exclusivity rule of the Idaho Worker's Compensation Act." Id. at *4. 
Most relevant to this appeal is how the U.S. District Court reached that decision. 
As Hecla does in this action, Battelle argued that Kearney and DeMoss were 
dispositive of the issue: "Battelle relies upon the decisions in Kearney and DeMoss 
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in_ support of its argument that the Complaint fails to allege it acted with the 
requisite specific intent to cause injury to Mr. Braase; i.e., that the Complaint's 
allegations of negligent conduct are insufficient to raise claims exempted from the 
exclusivity of the worker's compensation laws." Id. at *2. 
In turn, like the l\1areks, the employee argued that Dominguez was 
instructive on the application of the exclusivity-exception to conduct beyond mere 
negligence: 
Mr. Braase likens this case to Dominguez, arguing the facts alleged in 
the Complaint show Battelle's wilful and unprovoked physical 
aggression based on intentional conduct, not mere negligence. (Dkt. 13 
at 11-16.) In particular, Mr. Braase points to the allegations that the 
Battelle supervisors directed work to proceed despite knowing of the 
danger of an airborne release of radioactive material and the workers' 
questioning of whether the repackaging process should proceed. 
Additionally, the Complaint alleges Battelle failed to warn its 
employees of the known risks and danger of exposure and/or provide 
protective equipment or proper safety procedures. These allegations, 
Mr. Braase argues, demonstrate the wilful and unprovoked physical 
aggression necessary for the exemption to apply. Battelle maintains 
that these allegations sound in negligence and do not show the 
requisite intentional actions needed to fall within the exclusion to the 
exclusivity rule of the worker's compensation law. 
Id. The U.S. District Court then held that the employee had appropriately pled a 
"wilful or unprovoked physical aggression of Battelle": 
These allegations go to show Battelle knew of the risks and dangers of 
encountering the failed fuel plates when it ordered Mr. Braase to 
repackage and/or continue the repackaging process, failed to warn Mr. 
Braase of the dangers, failed to follow federal safety regulations, and 
intentionally and knowingly exposed Mr. Braase to radioactive 
particles. (Dkt. 1 at ir,r 12-15, 20, 23, 25-26, 67-69.) If true, such 
allegations may establish that l\lfr. Braase's injuries were caused by 
the willful or unprovoked physical aggression of Battelle. 
Id. at *3. In doing so, the Court illustrated some of the distinction between the 
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matter as pled and the Kearney and DeMoss decision: 
The allegations that Battelle knew of and concealed the danger and/or 
risk of exposure distinguishes this case from DeMoss where the 
employer did not have actual knowledge that the material was 
asbestos at the time the employees were directed to remove the 
material. See DeMoss, 795 P.2d at 877-78. The Kearney case is also 
somewhat different because the danger in that case was known to both 
the employee and employer.Kearney, 760 P.2d at 1172. The facts 
alleged in this case are closer to the facts in Dominguez where the 
danger was known to the employer but unknown to the employees. The 
Complaint here alleges Battelle instructed Mr. Braase to continue the 
repackaging process, even after the employees expressed safety 
concerns, knowing of and concealing the dangers in doing so. Whether 
Mr. Braase can ultimately prove Battelle's conduct was wilful and 
unprovoked physical aggression remains to be seen. On this Motion, 
the Court's obligation is to examine the allegations made in the 
Complaint and determine whether they are sufficient at this early 
stage to raise claims over which this Court may have subject matter 
jurisdiction. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds the Complaint 
here has done so. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
The record in this appeal likewise reveals that Hecla persisted in 
undermining the pillar in the ill-fated area despite fellow employees having 
expressed their concerns for the safety of that course of action. This well-reasoned 
decision further demonstrates the appropriateness of the Mareks' arguments in 
ad:vancing their claims. 
B. Kearney and DeMoss do not dictate the result in this matter. 
l. Kearney and DeMoss deny the exclusivity-exception to 
negligent conduct, but not to conduct beyond mere negligence. 
Heda's argument that workers' compensation exclusivity applies in this 
matter is essentially predicated on the position that the older Kearney and DeMoss 
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decisions are solely determinative of this matter. In short, the thrust of Hecla's 
argument is that the exclusivity exception only applies where there is an "intent to 
injure." (Respondents' Brief at 12.) However, this position, critically, avoids Justice 
Huntley's instructive foreshadowing in his Kearney concurrence, and this Court's 
more recent Dominguez decision. 
While both parties have extensively briefed Kearney, Justice Huntley's 
concurrence, in its entirety, bears reiteration: 
I concur with the majority opinion with the caveat that there can be 
instances where an employer's knowing ordering of an 
employee into an unsafe working environment would, in my 
judgment, rise to the level of wilful physical aggression .. 
The issue is whether conduct which lacks a specific intent to injure can 
properly be termed intentional under the terms of LC. § 72-209(3). As 
noted by the Court in Jones v. VIP Development, 472 N.E.2d 1046 
(Ohio 1984), 
[A]n intentional tort is an act committed with the intent to 
injure another, or committed with the belief that such injury is 
substantially certain to occur. See 1 Restatement of the Law 
2d, Torts (1965) 15, Section 8A. We hereby reject the 
proposition that a specific intent to injure is necessary to a 
finding of intentional misconduct. (Emphasis added.) 
1 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965) 15, Section 8A reads: 
The word "intent" is used throughout the Restatement of this 
Subject to denote that the actor desires to cause consequences 
of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are 
substantially certain to result from it. 
In the instant case there is no evidence to demonstrate that the 
employer knew the employee would operate the machine without the 
grass catcher affixed, which installation would have covered the 
opening in the chassis \vhich exposed the blade. 
Kearney, 114 Idaho at 758 (emphasis added). In short, Justice Huntley's 
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. 
concurrence expressly contemplated a scenario where knowingly sending an 
employee into a hazardous area went beyond the mere kinds of "accidents" 
contemplated by the workers' compensation scheme. 
Moreover, Justice Huntley's concurrence 1s based on the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, and did not come from some fantastical source. In fact, the 
particular section (8A) was also favorably utilized by the Court of Appeals in a later 
decision: 
The tort of battery requires intentional bodily contact which is either 
harmful or offensive. Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P.2d 1238 
(1986) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965)). 
The intent element of the tort of battery does not require a desire or 
purpose to bring about a specific result or injury; it is satisfied if the 
actor's affirmative act causes an intended contact which is 
unpermitted and which is harmful or offensive. See Rajspic v. National 
Mutual Ins. Co., 110 Idaho 729, 718 P.2d 1167 (1986); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 8A, 16, 18 and 20 (1965). 
Indeed, the contact and its result may be physically harmless. Thus, a 
person may commit a battery when intending only a joke, or a 
compliment-where an unappreciated kiss is bestowed without consent, 
or a misguided effort is made to render assistance. PROSSER & 
KEATON, THE LAW OF TORTS§§ 8, 9 (5th ed. 1984). 
White v. Univ. of Idaho, 115 Idaho 564, 565, 768 P.2d 827, 828 (Ct. App. 1989) aff'd, 
. 
118 Idaho 400, 797 P.2d 108 (1990). Further, the Restatement (Second) of Torts has 
been utilized on many occasions by this Court, including in a decision issued just a 
couple of weeks before the filing of this reply brief. Alexander v. Stibal, No. 41604, 
2016 WL 758000, at *7 (Idaho Feb. 26, 20l6)(quoting discussion of Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, Section 544, in Gray v. Tri-Way Const. Servs., Inc., 147 Idaho 378, 
210 P.3d 63 (2009)). 
Simply stated, Kearney and DeMoss rejected application of the exclusivity 
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exclusion as applied to negligent conduct by an employer. Kearney, 114 Idaho at 
757 ("It is not sufficient to prove that the alleged aggressor committed negligent 
acts that made it substantially certain that injury would occur.")(emphasis added); 
DeMoss, 118 Idaho at 179 ("To reiterate what we said in Kearney v. Denker, 'It is 
not sufficient to prove that the alleged aggressor committed negligent acts th.at 
m~de it substantially certain that injury would occur."')(emphasis added). Where 
the door remained open, however, was egregious, endangering conduct by an 
employer that went into that realm of conduct beyond bare negligence. It was 
precisely that area of the law that Justice Huntley spoke to in concurring in the 
Kearney result, saying, in effect, 'this result is correct, but here is the kind of 
conduct, beyond negligence, that will trigger the exception to the exclusion.' 
Dominguez brought that issue to the forefront in Idaho. Where Dominguez 
departs from Kearney and DeMoss is that the conduct by the employer went over 
and above simple negligence, and did not hinge on question of "intent to injure" a 
specific employee, or any "ill will" towards Scott Dominguez or any of the other 
employees involved. Instead, the question strictly hinged on the hazardous nature 
of the situation created by the employer, as there is nothing in any of the 
Dominguez cases that suggest the employer had any kind of specific intent to injure 
Mr. Dominguez. Even for Mr. Elias' criminal conviction, no such specific intent was 
required. See United States v. Elias, 269 F.3d 1003, 1018 (9th Cir.), as modified 
(Dec. 21, 2001), supplemented. 27 F. App'x 750 (9th Cir. 2001)(rejecting Elias' 
objection to jury instruction that provided that, to convict Mr. Elias, "[t]he 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 10 
government does not need to show that the defendant actually intended to harm or 
endanger any person."). The District Court here appeared to recognize this 
principle in the Dominguez cases, and how it differed from the Kearney and DeMoss 
matters. (Corrected Record ("C.R.") 970, discussing Dominguez: "In the case at bar, 
there are no allegations that Defendants acted with any subjective intent to harm 
Pete and/or Mike Marek, nor are there any allegations that Defendants believed 
that harm was substantially certain to occur.")(emphasis added). 
By way of aside, Hecla argues that the nature of the default judgment 1n 
Dominguez reflected a refusal by the Court to "review the merits of the plaintiffs 
claim," and, as such, "did not even purport to say anything about whether the facts 
alleged there satisfied the exception to the Exclusivity Rule[.]" (Respondents' Brief, 
at ·22.) More correctly, the Dominguez Court refused to review "the district court's 
denial of [employer's] summary judgment motion concerning Dominguez's factual 
claim." Dominguez, 142 Idaho at 13 (emphasis added). It refused to do so given the 
usual prohibition of reviewing denials of summary judgment motions. Id. It 
otherwise refused to review the default judgment because the employer never 
moved for relief. Id. 
Here, the discussion of the challenge was in the context of a summary 
judgment motion made against Dominguez' "factual claim." Defaults decide factual 
matters, and in Dominguez, the Court simply held that challenges to Dominguez' 
factual claim was unavailable. The viability of a legal claim under the exclusivity-
exception in light of those facts was validated by the Court. Id., 11-12 (discussing 
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exclusion and exception thereto). Again, defaults determine factual matters; 
theories must still be valid. Olson v. Kirkham, 111 Idaho 34, 37, 720 P.2d 21 7, 
220 (Ct. App. 1986) (cited in Dominguez)("On appeal, a defaulted defendant may not 
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in a default judgment, he may only contest 
the sufficiency of the complaint and its allegations to support the judgment."); 
Johnson v. State, 112 Idaho 1112, 1114-1115, 739 P.3d 411, 413-414 (Ct. App. 1987) 
("[T]he court may consider the merits of the underlying cause of action in 
determining whether entry of default is appropriate."); accord, generally, lOA 
Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2688 (3d ed.) ("Even after default, 
-
however, it remains for the court to consider whether the unchallenged facts 
constitute a legitimate cause of action, since a party in default does not admit mere 
conclusions of law."). Here, the Mareks' claims echo those of Dominguez and, in 
light of the evidence presented (which, even at a minimum, the District Court 
recognized as "disputed facts" (C.R. 973)), entitle the Mareks to summary judgment 
and/or denial of Heda's motion for summary judgment. 
Finally, Hecla also makes passing argument that references to "reckless" 
conduct help it escape liability. (Respondents' Brief at 2, 3, 12, & 34; compare with 
C.R. 408, 410 (MSHA citations) & R. Adden. 19 (MSHA Decision).) What Hecla fails 
to recognize, however, that under Idaho law, "reckless" conduct goes well beyond 
bare negligence, as recently discussed by this Court: 
Reckless misconduct differs from negligence in several important 
particulars. It differs from that form of negligence which consists in 
mere inadvertence, incompetence, unskillfulness or a failure to take 
precautions to enable the actor adequately to cope with a possible or 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 12 
probable future emergency in that reckless misconduct requires a 
conscious choice of a course of action either with knowledge of the 
serious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts which 
would disclose this danger to any reasonable man. It differs not only 
from the above-mentioned form of negligence, but also from that 
negligence which consists in intentionally doing an act with knowledge 
that it contains a risk of harm to others, in that the actor to be reckless 
must recognize that his conduct involves a risk substantially greater in 
amount than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent. 
Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., 152 Idaho 741, 751, 274 P.3d 1256, 1266 (20l2)(quoting 
State v. Papse, 83 Idaho 358, 362-63, 362 P.2d 1083, 1086 (1961)). Thus, Heda's 
argument on this point fails. 
Accordingly, reversal of the District Court's decision is appropriate, as, in 
light of the facts applicable in this matter, this case echoes the kind of conduct 
present in the Dominguez case such as to apply the exclusivity-exception. 
2. Certain facts proffered by Hecla are inaccurate and/or incomplete. 
In addressing the primary cases and facts at issue in this matter, Hecla also 
offers brief factual arguments in an effort to avoid reversal, primarily by attempting 
to weave a tale of good conduct by Heda's actors, and place blame on the Mareks. 
These efforts cannot change the facts of this case, or otherwise mask Heda's 
culpable conduct. 
a. Bayer's visit to the stope days before the collapse. 
Hecla attempts to argue that had Mr. Bayer (the Mine Superintendent) 
known that the stope was unsafe, he would not have visited it on April 13, two days 
before the rockfall that killed Pete Marek. (Respondents' Brief at 11, n.8.) It is true 
that Mr. Bayer visited the stope on April 13, along with other Hecla employees (Mr. 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 13 
De Voe, Mr. Cox, and Mr. Lund) as part of a weekly geology tour. (C.R. 777.) 
_ However, what Hecla's argument omits is what transpired then, and 
afterwards: 
• At the April 13 geology tour, Mr. Bayer observed that the stope was overwide. 
(C.R. 777 .) In particular, the stope was, in places, 24 feet in width, well in 
excess of the 20-foot maximum width.6 (C.R. 733, 11. 75:12-76:22.) 
• At the April 13 geology tour, Mr. Ruff, the production geologist who raised 
multiple warnings with Mr. Bayer, Mr. Cox, Mr. DeVoe, Mr. Lund, and 
others,7 advised Mr. De Voe to re-start the pillar "right away." (C.R. 681, 11. 
120:23-121:15.) 
• Subsequent blasting in the stope occurred on April 14. (C.R. 671, 11. 80:19-
81:10; 527.) 
These facts actually demonstrate the absence of the Mine Superintendent, 
Mr. Bayer, from the hazardous area in the time immediately preceding the roof 
collapse, after observing an overwide stope, after receiving a recommendation to re-
start a pillar, and after additional blasting. These facts, coupled with other 
warnings received in advance of the roof collapse, s might readily be construed by a 
jury to demonstrate that Mr. Bayer (and others) avoiding the area of danger, while 
6 Although unclear as to the date, miner Dan McGillis also testified that, in this 
approximate timeframe, he advised Doug Bayer to split the stope in light of the 
width, and was rebuffed. (C.R. 602-603, 11. 132:4-135:3.) 
7 C.R. 242-243, 11. 151:15-152:24; 244-245, 11. 153:6-155:4; and 402-407. 
s E.g., dribbling, which "indicates that the ground is weakening and there's a good 
possibility of a cave-in," which Dan McGillis testified he warned Doug Bayer about. 
(C.R. 572, 11. 13:5-14:24.) 
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directing others to work in it, much like Mr. Elias in Dominguez, who avoided 
spraying out the cyanide tank himself. 
b. The overlength of the pillar removal at issue. 
In response to the Mareks' argument that "the extent of the pillar removal in 
the 6150-15 stope was greater than had ever been done before in the mine," Hecla 
contends in a footnote that "both witnesses testified such a length had been done 
successfully in the past." (Compare Appellants Mareks' Brief-in-Chief at 30 with 
Respondents' Brief at 5-6, n.6.) In doing so, Hecla simply re-cites the same 
deposition testimony cited by the Mareks, and cites no other portion of the record in 
support of this contention. (Id.) Lest there be further confusion on this point, here 
is additional testimony from defendant Doug Bayer: 
3 Q So I want you to tell me everywhere in the mine 
4 that had in the underhand cut and fill method undercut a 
5 waste pillar to a distance of more than 70 feet from 
6 side -- completely exposing it from side to side. 
7 Do you understand my question? 
8 A More than 70 feet? 
9 Q Yes. 
10 A I'm not aware of more than 70 feet. Other than 
11 15 stope Cut 3. 15 stope Cut 2 excavated 30 feet of the 
12 pillar on the west side. 12 stope Cut -- 6100 Cut 1 
13 excavated about 56 feet, the pillar. 
(C.R. 499, 11. 22:3-13.)(emphasis added). 9 
Thus, as Hecla has failed to identify any other facts in the record to the 
contrary, this fact remains undisputed. 
9 The undercut at issue undermined the rock pillar for a distance of approximately 
7 4 feet, leaving it in the roof of the stope with cement fill on either side of it. (C.R. 
408; C.R. 497, 11. 15:1-16:1; C.R. 718, 11. 15:10-13). 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 15 
c. The proposed substitution of Bayer and Jordan as "engineers" in 
lieu of the actual Chief Engineer. 
Hecla also attempts to tout the mine engineering experience of Mr. Bayer and 
Mr. Jordan, attempting to substitute their "reviews" of the mining plan for that of 
the actual Chief Mining Engineer, Mr. Krusemark. (Respondents' Brief at 5.) 
Setting aside obvious questions of engineering competency in light of the MSHA 
mandatory standard violations, MSHA sanctions, and the death/injury suffered by 
miners in this case, at the time of the collapse, it was Mr. Krusemark - not Mr. 
Bayer or Mr. Jordan - who was the Chief Engineer for the mine.IO As previously 
noted, the pillar removal plan was not shown to Mr. Krusemark until after the 
collapse - his immediate reaction, upon observing the plans calling for removal of 
the pillar, was ''You gotta be fucking kidding me." (C.R. 534, 11. 18:1-
16)(emphasis added). Mr. Krusemark also indicated that the mine plan calling for 
the pillar removal would not have been approved without a tested, designed, 
engineered ground support plan. (C.R. 535, 11. 24:24-25:16). Thus, Heda's efforts to 
remedy the lack of Chief Engineer review and approval of the disastrous pillar-
removal plan, by contending that Mr. Bayer and Mr. Jordan's "reviews" were 
10 Mr. Bayer also admitted he was not a rock mechanics expert: 
66 
21 Q I believe you testified that you don't consider 
22 yourself a rock mechanics expert; is that correct? 
23 A An expert, no. 
(C.R. 510, 11. 66:21-23.) Recall, also, that Hecla did not have a full-time rock 
mechanics engineer until after the collapse, and no outside consultant was utilized 
to evaluate the pillar removal. (C.R. 511, 11. 72:6-21; 451, 11. 39:12-40:23; 659; 11. 
32:25-33:2; 693, 11. 14:14-15:5; & 725, 11. 43:13-18. 
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sufficient, can be safely disregarded by the Court. 
d. The renewed effort to blame Pete and Mike Marek for working 
where they were assigned to work. 
Appallingly, Hecla continues to blame Pete and Mike for Pete's death and 
Mike's injuries, desperate to avoid any responsibility for the rockfall for which 
MSHA has already severely sanctioned Hecla. (Respondents' Brief, at 14: 
"Defendants did not send the Mareks to the location where the accident occurred; 
the Mareks chose to go there on their own."). 
This argument has already been extensively rebutted by testimony presented 
by a number of witnesses, including defendants Doug Bayer and Dale Stepro: 
Mike Marek: 
21 Q. On the morning you were recounting the evening 
22 of the accident, sir, and did you talk with your shift 
23 boss before you went underground? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. And did you get any directions from him as to 
1 what you were to do? 
2 A. He said -- I asked him "What do you want us to 
3 do if we're muck bound?" And at first he just kind of 
4 went like this with his arm. 
5 Q. Let the record show that you're 
6 A. Yeah, like, "Well, I don't know." Then he 
7 goes, "Well, you can work on the spray chamber. 
8 Q. And did you, Larry, ever go to spray chamber 
9 that evening? 
10 A. No, but we were going to. 
11 Q. Sure. The decision was made to wet the muck. 
12 Larry suggested you wet the muck, correct? 
13 A. Correct. 
14 Q. And was the reason you went to wet the muck 
15 because you thought you would be able to move it during 
16 that shift sometime? 
17 A. Sure. Because sometimes we can load trucks, 
18 like I said, and I did see a truck at my stope. 
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(C.R. 884-885, 11. 309:21-310:18.) 
Doug Bayer: 
13 Q And it's typical in the stopes after the blasts 
14 when there's muck in the stopes, it's typical to water 
15 the muck down, isn't it? To wet it down? 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q \Vhy is that done? 








Q And that's something you don't have to 
specifically tell your miners? They know to do that? 
A They know to do that. 
Q Are you critical of Pete Marek for having 
watered down the muck in his stope? 
A I'm not critical of that. No. 
78 
1 Q Are you critical of Pete Marek in any respect? 
2 A No. 
3 Q Same question with regard to Mike Marek. Are 
4 you critical of him for having wet down the muck in his 
5 stope? 
6 A No. 
7 Q Are you critical of him in any respect for the 
8 events of April 15th, '11? 
9 A No. I don't believe either miner did anything 
10 wrong as to being in the - in the stope or whatnot. 
11 They have the freedom to plan their day. So 
12 this particular day that they were muck bound and they 
13 were given maintenance type jobs to do, maintain or fix 
14 something, repair something. 
15 So there's no set rule that a miner has to go 
16 wet down if he's not going to work his stope. He can. 
17 It's not uncommon. But they don't have to. They --
18 Q But you wouldn't have disciplined them or 
19 chastised them if you learned that that's what they did? 
20 A No. 
21 Q And if they were muck bound, but if they 
22 anticipated that some of the muck would be moved, they 
23 would want to minimize the dust if they could? 
24 A Yeah. It's kind of rare to -- trucks to show 
25 up, because normally the shifter has a plan and he lines 
79 
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1 out the muck crew, go here, here, here. And there's a 
2 lot of muck to move. So they don't normally just drive 
3 around and say, "I'm going to show up unannounced." 
4 Usually there's a plan on where they go. I wouldn't say 
5 that was -- I just can't see that being a motivator to 
6 wet down. But like I say, it's not uncommon. 
7 A miner will usually want to inspect the 
8 workplace, look for hazards, wet down, look to see if 
9 there's a mishole. He might be able to shoot a mishole 
10 on shift so the next shift doesn't have to, so the 
11 hazard's taken care of, that kind of thing. That's all 
12 part of the mining process. 
(C.R. 512-513, 11. 77:13-79:12)(emphases added). 
Dale Stepro: 
34 
1 Q. Okay. So on this particular shift, the 
2 Mareks weren't working out of position. Correct? 
3 MR. RAMSDEN: Object. Calls for a conclusion. 
4 You can go ahead and answer. 
5 THE WITNESS: They -- no, I -- I assigned them to 
6 do the spray chamber and everything, and I didn't even 
7 think about them going in there and looking at the muck 
8 pile. You know, that's -- you gotta figure miners are a 
9 whole different breed. Okay? And yeah, I didn't even 
10 think about them going in there and looking at the muck 
11 piles. Very true. 
12 BYMR. NICKELS: 
13 Q. Was it unusual that they went in and hosed 
14 down the muck pile? 
15 A. Probably not. 
16 Q. Would that be part of a routine shift for 
17 the Mareks if they completed their other assigned tasks? 
18 MR. RAMSDEN: Object. Foundation. Go ahead. Go 
19 ahead and answer the questions. 
20 THE WITNESS: I would imagine, yes, going in to 
21 look things over. 
22 BYMR. NICKELS: 
23 Q. And at no point on that shift did you tell 
24 them not to hose down the muck pile? 
25 A. No, I didn't tell them that. 
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36 
19 Q. And what I wanted to in particular ask is: 
20 The second column of that letter, which is on the first 
21 page -- and I'll just read it so we're on the same page 
22 as to which one I'm talking about. It's the paragraph 
23 that reads, "Every miner knows that it is common 
24 protocol to wet down and access the blast on the next 
25 shift, even if you are not assigned to work that 
37 
1 heading. Larry and Mark did what every miner always 
2 does and what has always been accepted by the company as 
3 standard operating procedures." Do you agree with that 
4 statement? 
5 MR. RAMSDEN: Object. Calls for a legal 
6 conclusion. Go ahead and answer. 
7 THE WITNESS: When I was a miner, I did the same 
8 thing. I went in and wet down the muck pile. 
9 BYMR. NICKELS: 
10 Q. So there's nothing in that particular 
11 statement from Mr. Norman that you disagree with? 
12 A. No. 
(C.R. 636, 11. 34:1-25 & 36:19-37:12)(emphases added). 
George Houchin (miner): 
23 
8 Q. And what I wanted to ask you about on this 
9 exhibit is one particular paragraph in this letter from 
10 Mr. Norman, and it's this paragraph in the second column 
11 which says, "Every miner knows that it is common 
12 protocol to wet down and access the blast on the next 
13 shift even if you are not assigned to work that heading. 
14 Larry and Mike did what every miner always does and what 
15 has always been accepted by the company as standard 
16 operating procedures." Do you have any disagreement 
17 with that paragraph? 
18 A. Not one. 
(C.R. 618, 11. 23:8-18.)11 
11 J:'he letter referred to is a letter to the editor submitted by a Lucky Friday Mine 
miner, Rick Norman. (C.R. 64 7-649.) 
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Dan McGillis ("Sugar Daddy" miner): 
98 
5 Q So if you're muck bound, what do you do? 
6 A What would I do? 
7 Q Yeah. 
8 A I would go in, I would wet my muck pile down, I 
9 would hang my wire, is what I would do. 
155 
2 Q And when you went into a stope to do your work, 
3 you've told us earlier that you would muck out the area 
4 if there was muck there; correct? 





















Q You didn't have to be told specifically by your 
shifter to muck out, did you? 
A No. 
Q You knew to do that. 
A Yes. 
Q And you would wet the muck down? 
A Yes. 
Q And again, you didn't have to be told 
specifically to do that? 
A No. 
MR. RAMSDEN: Object as leading. 
MR. HAVAS: Q You knew to do that? 
A Yes. 
MR. RAMSDEN: Object as leading. 
MR. HAVAS: Q Would you wet down the muck even if 
you were muck bound? 
A Yes. 
Q Why? 
A I would wet down the muck and hang my wire if I 
was muck bound. The reason being is that yes, I am muck 
156 
1 bound, but at any time they could come down to start 
2 mucking me out to where I could start mucking, and I 
3 would be prepared to do that at that time. 
4 Q Do you understand that Larry and Mike Marek on 
5 the 15th of April 2011 wet down their muck piles? 
6 A Yes, I understand they did. 
7 Q Even though they were muck bound? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q Did that strike you as out of the ordinary or 
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10 unusual? 
11 A No. 
(C.R. 594, 11. 98:5-9 and 608, 11.155:2-156:11.) 
Even on reconsideration, the District Court ultimately agreed that the 
Mareks were working where they should have been: 
With regard to the argument by the plaintiffs that the general 
duty assignment to that stope was sufficient to constitute an 
authorization that they be in there watering the muck, I think 
that's true, but that's not the test. As Mr. Ramsden points out, was 
there express direction to go in there which amounted to willful or 
unprovoked physical aggression? 
(2nd Tr., 11. 26:13-19)(emphasis added). 
At the barest of minimums, Heda's efforts to dispute this point illustrate at 
least some disputed fact regarding "an employer's knowing ordering of an employee 
into an unsafe working environment" (per Justice Huntley) such as should have 
precluded the granting of summary judgment in Heda's favor. 
C. The genesis and application of Mandolidis actions in West Virginia 
are more instructive to this Court than a broader, more ill-defined 
multi-state survey. 
Hecla notes that a majority of states require an 'intent to injure,' calling it an 
"almost unanimous rule." (Respondents' Brief at 14)(emphasis in original). 12 Hecla 
12 There actually appears to be several states that deviate from the majority rule: 
Indeed, constructive intent has been said to be an acceptable 
substitute for actual intent even in cases where the intentional-tort 
exception is worded in terms of 'willful' injury or 'deliberate intention' 
to inflict injury. In jurisdictions following this view, the courts 
generally have adopted the broad Restatement definition of intent, 
which states that intent denotes that the actor desires to cause 
consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are 
substantially certain to result from it. . . . n.66. To date, courts in 
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argues that, in light of Kearney and DeMoss, Idaho simply follows what the 
m~jority of other states do. Hecla goes on to make discussion of exemplar decisions 
from other states favorable to its position. 
It is problematic, however, to rely upon what amounts to a 50-state survey in 
the context of workers' compensation. Unlike "uniform" laws such as, e.g., the 
Uniform Commercial Code and the Uniform Probate Code, workers' compensation 
laws developed in their home states, under their own statutory language and 
caselaw. The language of the statute at issue in Idaho, for example - "in any case 
where the injury or death is proximately caused by the wilful or unprovoked 
physical aggression of the employer" - is not replicated verbatim in any other state. 
What happens in other states' 'laboratories of democracy' provides no 
universal rule.13 What it does provide, however, are examples of different historical 
treatments of workers' compensation law, and the key legal and public policy 
considerations underlying those laws and exceptions thereto. 
A good example, analogous to this case, is West Virginia. Prior to more 
recent statutory amendments (discussed below), West Virginia's exclusivity-
Louisiana, Ohio, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, 
and Texas have recognized this view. In West Virginia, judicial 
precedent in this regard has been modified by statute. 
48 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 1 (originally published in 1987). 
13 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311, 52 S. Ct. 371, 386-87, 76 L. Ed. 
7 47 (1932)("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel 
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.")(Brandeis, 
J., dissenting). 
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exception stated very rigid language, much akin to what Hecla advocates here: 
If injury or death result to any employee from the deliberate 
intention of his employer to produce such injury or death, the 
employee, the widow, widower, child or dependent of the employee 
shall have the privilege to take under this chapter, and shall also have 
cause of action against the employer, as if this chapter had not been 
enacted, for any excess of damages over the amount received or 
receivable under this chapter. 
1913 W.Va.Acts, ch. 10 s 28 (as cited in Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 161 W. 
Va. 695, 698 n.2, 246 S.E.2d 907, 910 n.2 (1978))(emphasis added). In Mandolidis, 
the West Virginia Supreme Court evaluated three occupational injury cases, all 
dismissed for failing to meet the exclusivity-exception. 246 S.E.2d at 909-910. 
The Mandolidis court gave thought to the history and purpose underlying the 
workers' compensation scheme as a whole, offering: 
What was the intention of the original section? The answer to this 
specific question can best be answered by recalling the purpose for the 
enactment of workmen's compensation legislation in the first instance. 
The paramount reason for such legislation was, of course, that under 
the common law tort system workers injured in industrial accidents 
recovered compensatory damages in a rather small percentage of cases. 
The Workmen's Compensation Act was designed to remove 
[n]egligently caused industrial accidents from the common law tort 
system. 
246 S.E.2d at 910-11 (emphasis added). The Mandolidis court found that an overly 
strict reading of the exclusivity-exception created a result that ultimately undercut 
the core reason that workers' compensation laws were created: 
We are of the opinion that reading the language of the provision under 
review here to mean the same thing as similar wording in a criminal 
statute defining murder is contrary to the basic rules governing the 
construction of workmen's compensation statutes. There is no 
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adequate justification for adhering to the construction of a statute 
which is not only erroneous but which works an injustice on persons 
injured as a result of conduct which is so likely to produce injury or 
death that its performance, under all circumstances, could perhaps 
warrant criminal liability. No person or organization of persons should 
be permitted to escape full responsibility for conduct which could be 
found to be criminal in nature. 
246 S.E.2d at 913. In light of that, the Mandolidis court held that conduct removed 
from simple negligence was no longer entitled to protection under the workers' 
compensation scheme: 
The law of this jurisdiction recognizes a distinction between 
negligence, including gross negligence, and wilful, wanton, and 
reckless misconduct. The latter type of conduct requires a subjective 
realization of the risk of bodily injury created by the activity and as 
such does not constitute any form of negligence .... 
In our view when death or injury results from wilful, wanton 
or reckless misconduct such death or injury is no longer 
accidental in any meaningful sense of the word, and must be 
taken as having been inflicted with deliberate intention for the 
purposes of the workmen's compensation act. 
In light of the foregoing discussion, the phrase "deliberate intent to 
produce such injury or death" must be held to mean that an employer 
loses immunity from common law actions where such employer's 
conduct constitutes an intentional tort or wilful, wanton, and reckless 
misconduct. 
246 S.E.2d at 913-14 (emphasis added). 
With these considerations, the Mandolidis court evaluated the two cases at 
issue: one involving the removal of a safety guard from a saw at a furniture plant, 
one involving a platform used in the construction of a bridge, and one - as here -
involving a miner's death in a roof fall. Id. at 914-920. The lower court dismissals 
in· all three cases were reversed for further proceedings, in light of the court's 
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consideration of the kind of conduct that would fall within "deliberate intent." Id. 
Importantly, the Mandolidis court offered these considerations in the 
evaluation of such cases, salient to the determination of this matter: 
We are of the view that complicated industrial "accidents," wherein the 
state of mind of company representatives is critical, seldom. lend 
themselves to disposition by summary judgment, and where there is 
any doubt such a motion should be refused. Conclusory affidavits 
simply denying the existence of the requisite intent, obviously make no 
contribution to the factual development of the litigated event and, 
therefore, provide no assistance to the trial court in determining 
whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. 
246 S.E.2d at 918 (em.phases added); compare with Respondents' Brief, p. 29, n. 16 
(quoting Bayer and Jordan declarations' identical pronouncements that "I did not 
want to hurt anyone.") 
The Mandolidis decision gave rise to what was known in West Virginia as a 
Mandolidis action, the general test for which was as follows: 
In the Syllabus of Kane v. Corning Glass Works, we restated the 
burden the plaintiff bears in a Mandolidis action: 
"Under Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries, Inc., it is essential, in 
order for an injured employee to recover, that the employer's 
misconduct must be of an intentional or wilful, wanton and 
reckless character, that the employer must have knowledge 
and appreciation of the high degree of risk of physical harm. to 
another created by such misconduct, and, of course, that the 
employer's action must be the proximate cause of the injury." 
Evidence of "wilful, wanton and reckless misconduct" which would 
warrant a finding of "deliberate intent" must be "clear and forceful in 
high degree." 
Delp v. Itm.ann Coal Co., 176 W. Va. 252, 255, 342 S.E.2d 219, 222 (1986)(citations 
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omitted). 14 
In short, the Mareks do not doubt that Hecla can produce caselaw from other 
jurisdictions, under other workers' compensation laws, stating that a specific intent 
to injure is required for that state's exclusivity-exception. However, under Idaho's 
law, the framework proposed by Justice Huntley in Kearney and apparently 
approved of in Dominguez does not present an application of the law that is novel in 
theory or practice. To the contrary, West Virginia's Mandolidis actions demonstrate 
full enunciation and application of an exclusivity-exception that reaches more 
broadly than bare criminal intent. 
14 Mandolidis was ultimately superceded by statute, as explained by the Fourth 
Circuit: 
In 1978, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals issued a far-
reaching decision in Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries[.] It ruled that 
deliberate intention "must be held to mean that an employer loses 
immunity from common law actions where such employer's conduct 
constitutes an intentional tort or willful, wanton, and reckless 
misconduct." This holding stimulated much public debate and, in 1983, 
the West Virginia Legislature amended the compensation statute with 
the express intent of modifying the standard adopted in Mandolidis. 
The statute now states that "in enacting the immunity provisions of 
this chapter, the legislature intended to create a legislative standard 
for loss of that immunity of more narrow application and containing 
more specific mandatory elements than the common law tort system 
concept and standard of willful, wanton and reckless misconduct." 
Handley v. Union Carbide Corp., 804 F.2d 265, 269 (4th Cir. 1986)(citations 
omitted). The amended statute ultimately provided two alternative methods of 
proving deliberate intent: first, where an employer acted with a "deliberately 
formed intention to produce the specific result of injury or death of any employee," 
and second, a multi-step test whereupon a "jury could infer a deliberate intent to 
injure" predicated on the existence of "specific unsafe working condition." Id.; W. 
Va. Code Ann. § 23-4-2. 
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D. Hecla's public policy concerns are overstated, as public policy is 
better served by allowing suits such as the Mareks'. 
Hecla also argues, broadly, that Kearney and DeMoss were correctly decided, 
so as not to "disturb the balance between employees and employers that is inherent 
in the worker's compensation system." (Respondents' Brief at 24-26.) 
Heda's public policy argument attempts to weave a doomsday scenario where 
"limits on litigation expenses" are undone, lawsuits against employers rise 
dramatically, and summary judgment would be all but impossible. (Id. at 26.) 
These arguments amount to little more than hyperbole and speculation. 
The Mareks cannot, of course, speak to the number of cases that might arise 
were this Court to expressly confirm Justice Huntley's position in Kearney and 
validate the underlying legal premise of Dominguez. However, the Mareks would 
note that even in the years since those two cases (Kearney being issued in 1988), 
there does not appear to have been any significant surge in exclusivity-exception 
cases that have somehow overwhelmed Idaho's judiciary. Instead, the most 
significant case - Dominguez - involved the kind of heinous conduct and 
catastrophic injury that would be the kind most appropriate for a Mandolidis-type 
action (as the Mareks' case should be). In any event, if increased litigation served to 
encourage employers to avoid the kind of reckless conduct that can lead to employee 
deaths, then it could only be characterized as a successful advancement in Idaho's 
workers' compensation law and the related public policy. 
Hecla also complains that "[a]s a practical matter, in almost any tort case, a 
plaintiff can alleged negligence, gross negligence, or recklessness." (Id.) Of course, 
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our judicial system's process of discovery and summary judgment can weed out 
meritless claims. But, as a more salient counterpoint, the Mareks note that Hecla 
is actually advocating the opposite absurd position. That is, Hecla believes that an 
employer's mere invocation of 'not wanting to hurt someone' instantly removes any 
conduct no matter how egregious - from the exclusivity exception. See, e.g., 
Respondents' Brief, p. 29, n. 16 (quoting Bayer and Jordan declarations' identical 
pronouncements that "I did not want to hurt anyone."). Indeed, under Heda's 
construction of the law, Allen Elias - who was sentenced to 17 years in federal 
prison for his conduct - would have been able to wholly avoid the exclusivity-
exception with a single, one-sentence declaration that "I did not want to hurt Scott 
Dominguez."15 
Finally, as to Heda's argument that such cases would not be "easily resolved 
without trial," West Virginia's experience at least suggests differently.16 
(Respondents' Brief at 26.) While there are certainly meritorious cases that will 
proceed to trial, non-meritorious cases will be filtered out in the summary judgment 
process. Compare Mooney v. E. Associated Coal Corp., 17 4 W. Va. 350, 352, 326 
15 And given Elias' objections to the jury instruction in his criminal matter which 
provided that "The government does not need to show that the defendant actually 
intended to harm or endanger any person," it certainly appears that he argued, or 
intended to argue, that he meant no harm to Scott Dominguez. United States v. 
Elias, 269 F.3d at 1018. 
16 Notably, Mandolidis was developed by the supreme court of state where mining -
specifically, coal mining - was and is a critical component of their economy. So 
much so, that the West Virginia state flag - like Idaho's - bears the image of a 
miner. Concerns about how this may effect Idaho's mining industry - especially in 
light of this particular action, a mining case - should be alleviated by West 
Virginia's own movement into Mandolidis and the subsequent amendment of the 
relevant exclusivity-exception statute to incorporate those principles. 
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S.E.2d 427, 429 (1984)Gury verdict in Mandolidis action in favor of surviving spouse 
of miner killed in roof-fall affirmed) with Chambers v. Sovereign Coal Corp., 170 W. 
Va. 537, 538-40, 295 S.E.2d 28, 29-31 (1982)(summary judgment decision affirmed 
in case involving employee killed when crane he was using struck power line). Even 
if a Mandolidis-type matter proceeded to trial, the usual tools of directed verdict 
and judgment notwithstanding the verdict are available to the courts. See, e.g., 
Delp v. Itmann Coal Co., 342 S.E.2d at 222-23 (directed verdict against employee 
affirmed); Dreyer v. Weirton Steel, Div. of Nat. Steel Corp., 178 W. Va. 540, 542-
543, 363 S.E.2d 127, 129-130 (1986)(iudgment notwithstanding the verdict against 
employee affirmed). 
Accordingly, Heda's public policy concerns are overstated. Instead, public 
policy - especially that underpinning Idaho's workers' compensation laws - is 
advanced by confirming that actions such as the Mareks' fit within Idaho's 
exclusivity-exception. Workers' compensation laws, "designed to remove 
[n]egligently caused industrial accidents from the common law tort system," 
should not be construed to as to work "an injustice on persons injured as a result of 
conduct which is so likely to produce injury or death that its performance, under all 
circumstances, could perhaps warrant criminal liability." 246 S.E.2d at 911 & 913. 
On this point, Hecla simply re-argues its position that Kearney and DeMoss 
require a specific "intent to injure," such that facts presented by the Mareks 
regarding "whether Defendants received warnings that the mining practices were 
dangerous and whether it was necessary for the chief engineer to approve the 
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mining plan" were not material for the purpose of summary judgment. (C.R. 973.) 
As discussed above, however, these precise facts sufficiently establish Heda's 
knowledge and conduct for the purpose of granting judgment in favor of the Mareks. 
Alternatively, at a minimum, such "disputed" facts should have precluded summary 
judgment being granted in favor of Hecla. 
As a related aside, why these particular facts matter, and how they fit into 
excepting this case from Idaho's workers' compensation scheme, can be illustrated 
by a recent West Virginia case, under its narrower, post-Mandolidis law. In 
Reynolds v. Consol of Kentucky, Inc., the Southern District of West Virginia 
weighed whether a mining fatality came within the "deliberate intent" exception to 
West Virginia's workers' compensation laws.17 See 2010 WL 3522130 (S.D.W. Va. 
Sept. 8, 2010). That matter was examined under the provision addressing "unsafe 
working condition[s]" that are known to the employer - much like the "unsafe 
working environment" discussed by Justice Huntley in his Kearney concurrence. 
The Reynolds case concerned a miner killed in an underground mine roof 
collapse. Id. at *I. The Reynolds court ultimately rejected application of the 
exception, but did so on critical safety facts not present in the Mareks' case. The 
Court explained: 
Every Consol employee who examined the roof in the area where the 
17 W. Va. Code §23-4-2. West Virginia's current statutory provisions (amended post-
Mandolidis, as discussed above) regarding the exclusivity exception are notably far 
more verbose and detailed than Idaho's currently are. These statutory provisions 
fold in (and arguably narrow) the Mandolidis principles, and include both an 
express specific intent to injure exception, and an express provision regarding 
"unsafe working condition[s]" known to the employer. (Id.) 
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accident occurred concluded that the roof was safe and secure on 
September 3, 2007. 
The record is completely devoid of evidence that Consol knew that the 
roof in the No. 4 panel presented a strong probability of serious injury 
or death. Indeed, the evidence is just the opposite. Shawn Johnson, the 
continuous miner operator who Brent Reynolds relieved, stated that 
when he was working on the No. 4 entry he "didn't see [him]self in any 
immediate danger. If I would have I wouldn't have been there." 
Johnson Depo. at 13 ("Now, if I would have thought we had a 
condition, a dangerous condition, you know, I would have looked for 
more support or anything, but I didn't feel that we were in any 
immediate danger there."). Richard Wiley, a roof bolter working in the 
area stated that the roof there "was pretty good. Actually, that section 
right there was a pretty good section." Deposition of Richard Wiley, 
July 17, 2009, at 10 (Exhibit 6 to Defendant's Motion; Exhibit N to 
Plaintiffs Memo.). Ron Yates, Reynold's co-worker agreed: "Everything 
looked all right. Everything looked good. I didn't see anything out of 
the ordinary. No reason why we couldn't start mining coal." Yates 
Depo. at 10. Because plaintiff cannot show that Consol had actual 
knowledge that the transition zone at issue presented a high 
probability of death or injury to Brent Reynolds, her deliberate intent 
claim must fail. 
Id. at *2 & 7. The Reynolds court went on to explain how there was no evidence 
that the employer had failed its inspection duties, either: 
In Ryan [v. Clonch Indus., Inc., 636 S.E.2d 756 (W.Va. 2006)], the 
employer admitted that it had failed to conduct a mandatory hazard 
inspection which would have revealed the unsafe working condition 
resulting in injury. Id. at 762-66. The Ryan court refused to allow the 
employer to deny actual knowledge holding that 
where the defendant employer has failed to perform a 
reasonable evaluation to identify hazards in the workplace in 
violation of a statute, rule or regulation imposing a mandatory 
duty to perform the same, the performance of which may have 
readily identified certain workplace hazards, the defendant 
employer is prohibited from denying that it possessed "a 
subjective realization" of the hazard asserted in the deliberate 
intent action, and the employee, upon demonstrating such 
violation, is deemed to have satisfied his or her burden of proof 
with respect to showing "subjective realization" pursuant to W. 
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Va.Code § 23-4-2(c)(2(ii)(B). 
Id. at 766. This case is distinguishable from Ryan as there 1s no 
evidence Consol failed to carry out its inspection duties. 
The No. 4 panel existed at least seven months prior to the accident on 
September 3, 2007. Deposition of Thomas Charles, November 5, 2009, 
at 51 (Exhibit A to Defendant's Reply Brief). During that time, both 
the federal Mine Safety and Health Administration ("MHSA") and the 
West Virginia Office of Miners' Health Safety and Training 
("WVOMHST") examined and inspected the area quarterly. Id. at 52, 
55, and 106, 639 S.E.2d 756. Adequacy of the roof and roof control 
measures were a part of this inspection process and Consol was never 
issued a citation because of roof problems in the No. 4 panel prior to 
the accident. 
(Id. at *7-8 & n.1) In this matter, those facts that the Reynolds court placed 
particular emphasis on - no concern amongst the miners, regular inspections 
including control considerations, a long-existing roof, etc. - are not present in this 
action. Instead, the facts in this matter demonstrate precisely the opposite: 
• No engineer review and approval was secured. (Appellants Mareks' Brief-in-
Chief at 28-30.) Heda's Chief Engineer proclaimed, "You gotta be fucking 
kidding me" on seeing the stope map post-collapse (C.R. 534, 11. 18:15-16), 
and testified that he would not have approved the cuts without a tested, 
designed, engineered ground support plan (C.R. 535, 11. 24:24-25:2.) 
• The cut was greater than had ever been done before in the mine, despite 
Hecla having no rock mechanics engineer and asking no outside consultant to 
evaluate the pillar removal. (C.R. 717-718, 11. 13:18-14:13; 511, 11. 72:6-21; 
451, 11. 39: 12-40:23; 659, 11. 32:25-33:2; 693, 11. 14:14-15:5; & 725, 11. 43:13-18.) 
• Hecla' s Safety Foreman had no role in the decision to remove the pillars, and 
did not review the plans in advance of removing the pillar. (C.R. 551-554, 11. 
19:25-23:22; 25:25-27:4; 29:12-30:24.) This was despite the fact that the stope 
was ultimately blasted even wider than intended, but no additional support 
was installed or even considered. (C.R. 453-454, 11. 49:10-50:17; 517, 11. 96:4-
12.) 
• Hecla was specifically warned, on multiple occasions, by a production 
geologist about the dangers in removing the pillars. (C.R. 242-243, 11. 151:15-
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152:24; 244-246, 11. 153:6-155:4; & 402-407.) 
-• Hecla was warned by a "Sugar Daddy" (high-seniority) miner about problems 
with the pillar removal. (C.R. 572, II. 13:5-14:24; 602-603, II. 132:4-135:3.) 
• Despite these overwhelming safety issues and warnings, the Mareks were 
still placed directly into danger by being ordered to work in the stope, 
performing work within their normal scope of duties. (See generally C.R. 835-
841; 618, 11. 23:8-18; 593-594, 11. 97:25-98:9; 636, II. 35:4-37:12; 647-649; 123-
124, II. 32:25-33:3; 884-885, 11. 309:21-310:18; 512-513, 11. 77:13-79:12; 636, 11. 
34:1-25 & 36:19-37:12; 618, 11. 23:8-18; 594, 11. 98:5-9; & 608, II. 155:2-156:11.) 
Further, as compared to Reynolds, where MSHA was involved in the inspection of 
the impacted areas in the months prior to the roof fall, MSHA here roundly 
sanctioned Hecla following the collapse, including: 
• Citations by MSHA relating to the removal of pillars, which MSHA found to 
be an "unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard." (E.g., 
C.R. 408-413.) 
• A Decision and Order in the MSHA Civil Penalty Proceeding against Hecla 
(R. Adden. 8-26)("MSHA Order"), which imposed significant penalties against 
Hecla for its actions in undercutting the pillars. Importantly, the MSHA 
Order highlighted Heda's knowledge: ""I find that the violation was the 
result of Heda's reckless disregard and unwarrantable failure to comply with 
the safety standard .... Management knew that (1) fractures and faults were 
often present in the host rock; (2) miners were going to undercut the pillars 
for a [sic] considerable distances; (3) undercutting pillars for significant 
distances was not a typical practice in the Gold Hunter section of the mine, 
and ( 4) no engineering study or any other study had been undertaken to 
determine whether its ground support plan would adequately support the 
roof under such conditions." (R. Adden. 19 & 24.) 
In short, these facts matter. The bare flaunting of federal safety laws and workers' 
lives for the sake of a few extra dollars in ore are what separate this case from cases 
involving, e.g., a missing lawnmower attachment (Kearney) or missing safety 
equipment before asbestos testing of a boiler's insulation. (DeMoss). These facts 
demonstrate the "employer's knowing ordering of an employee into an unsafe 
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working environment" that Justice Huntley warned about in Kearney. As such, 
they appropriately provide a basis to grant summary judgment to the Mareks and 
to -deny summary judgment in Heda's favor. Accordingly, the District Court erred 
in holding there were no material facts in dispute, and the District Court's decision 
should be reversed. 
E. Hecla should have borne the burden on summary judgment. 
Hecla argues that the Mareks "confuse the ultimate burden on the merits 
with the burden at summary judgment." (Respondents' Brief at 26.) This argument 
fails. 
First, the law 1s clear: "a nonmoving defendant has the burden of 
supporting a claimed affirmative defense on a motion for summary judgment." 
Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765, 771, 215 P.3d 485, 491 (2009) (emphasis 
added). Hecla bore the burden of proof on summary judgment on its affirmative 
defense, not the Mareks. 
Second, as to why this is important, Hecla argues that, "from either point of 
view," the exclusivity-exception is inapplicable because "Defendants introduced 
evidence that they had no intent to injure the Mareks." (Respondents' Brief at 29.) 
Of course, in so arguing, they point only to the Bayer and Jordan declarations' 
identical pronouncements that "I did not want to hurt anyone." (Respondents' 
Brief, p. 29, n. 16.) Arguing that the burden then shifts to the Mareks - without 
addressing the MSHA violations, the lack of engineering review, the lack of safety 
review, the lack of ground support, the disregard for warnings, etc. - simply doesn't 
comport with the appropriate burden to be placed on Hecla. That is, demonstrating 
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- at least in the summary judgment context - that this case was not a case of an 
"employer's knowing ordering of an employee into an unsafe working environment." 
F. 
As such, Heda's argument on this point fails.is 
The District Court erred in holding that Respondents Baker, Jordan, 
Bayer, Hogamier, Moore, and Stepro were fellow servants immune 
from suit under I.C. §72-209. 
Hecla asserts that the District Court correctly held that the individual 
defendants are immune under Idaho Code §72-209, for the same reasons that 
summary judgment was granted to Hecla. (Respondents' Brief, at 31.) Hecla 
asserts no other grounds for such immunity. 
Accordingly, for the same reasons that summary judgment in favor of Hecla 
should be reversed, so should summary judgment in favor of the individual 
defendants be reversed. 
G. The Mareks' Motion for Reconsideration should have been granted. 
1. The District Court appropriately heard the Mareks' Motion to 
Reconsider. 
Hecla contends that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the Marek's 
Motion to Reconsider, arguing that the Marek's Motion for Reconsideration did not 
state with particularity the basis for the motion. (Respondents' Brief, at 31-32.) In 
particular, Hecla asserts that the motion was untimely per I.R.C.P. 7(b)(l). (Id.) 
1s "In making its argument, Hecla also makes the illogical leap that, because the 
Mareks pursued worker's compensation claims (one of which, Mike Marek's, was 
resisted by Hecla), the Mareks then bore the burden on summary judgment. Such a 
contention is refuted by this Court's own pronouncement on burden, discussed 
above. Further, as seen in Dominguez, it is not inconsistent for an injured worker to 
seek workers' compensation benefits and pursue remedies under the exclusivity-
exception. 
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Here, the summary judgment decision at issue was issued on April 21, 2015, 
with the formal Judgment later issuing on May 5, 2014. (C.R. 977 & 990.) The 
Marek's Motion for Reconsideration was filed on April 29, 2015, well within the 
time period allowed under I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B).I9 (R. Adden., at 1.) The motion 
identified both the rule under which the motion was made, and the particular order 
for which reconsideration as being sought: 
COME NOW the plaintiffs in the above-entitled action, by and 
through their undersigned counsel of record, pursuant to Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 1 l(a)(2)(B), and hereby move this Court for 
reconsideration of its ruling as set forth in the Memorandum Decision 
and Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed April 
21, 2015. 
This motion will be based upon a supporting memorandum and 
affidavits filed in accord with the time requirements of the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure, as well as all other pleadings and papers on file in 
this action. 
(R: Adden., at 2.) Accordingly, this satisfies the requirements of Rule 7, and the 
District Court appropriately heard the Marek's Motion for Reconsideration. 
In any event, the Mareks subsequently submitted their supporting 
memorandum on August 4, 2015, 14 days in advance of the August 18, 2015 
hearing.20 (R. Adden., at 27; Transcript, August 18, 2015 ("2nd Tr.").) This 
memorandum further outlined the facts and authority underpinning the motion, as 
I9 I.R.C.P. ll(a)(2)(B) provides, in relevant part, "(B) Motion For Reconsideration. A 
motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial court may be 
made at any time before the entry of final judgment but not later than fourteen (14) 
days after the entry of the final judgment." 
20 As explained at hearing, the lag between the motion and hearing was due, in 
part, to the difficulty in securing hearing dates in light of Judge Simpson's 
retirement. (2nd Tr., 11. 6:22-7:7.) 
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is common practice in Idaho. See, e.g., Nava v. Rivas-Del Toro, 151 Idaho 853, 862, 
264 P.3d 960, 969 (2011) ("When filing a motion for summary judgment, the moving 
party must notify the opposing party of the particular grounds for the motion. The 
motion must 'state with particularity the grounds therefor including the number of 
the applicable civil rule, if any, under which it is filed, and shall set forth the relief 
or order sought.' Idaho R. Civ. P. 7(b)(l). Typically, parties moving for 
summary judgment merely state the relief or order sought in the motion, 
and then state with particularity the grounds for the motion in a 
supporting memorandum.")(emphasis added). Moreover, even where the District 
Co_urt may find the memorandum to be untimely or late, the District Court has 
discretion to hear the motion. See, e.g., I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(D); accord, Marcher v. 
Butler, 113 Idaho 867, 869 (1988)("Butler is correct that a movant who neither 
requests oral argument nor submits written briefs may find that its motion has 
been denied by the trial court without notice. The rules grant such discretion. . .. 
Rule 7 only says that the court may dismiss the motion without notice, and clearly 
does not require this, and does not even establish a time frame in which filed 
motions must be noticed up for argument. [I]t is equally within the trial court's 
discretion to permit written or oral argument, .... "). As Hecla merely argues a lack 
of discretion, rather than any abuse of discretion, Heda's argument fails. 
Finally, Hecla also argues that, if filed as something other than a motion for 
reconsideration, the Mareks' Motion for Reconsideration was beyond the jurisdiction 
of the District Court, per IAR 13(b). (Respondents' Brief at 32-33.) The Court can 
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disregard this argument, as the Mareks do not contend that their expressly-named 
Motion for Reconsideration was anything other than a motion for reconsideration. 
2. The District Court erred in denying the Mareks' Motion for 
Reconsideration of the District Court's summary judgment 
decision. 
Hecla asserts that the District Court did not err in its ruling on the Mareks' 
Motion for Reconsideration, and in particular, its rulings on summary judgment 
burden, the Mareks' scope of work, and the MSHA Decision. 
a. Hecla bore the burden of proof on summary judgment. 
As to the issue of burden, Hecla points to a fleeting, speculative musing by 
the Court otherwise holding that the Mareks had the burden on summary 
judgment, that "Hecla clearly met any initial burden it had pleading the affirmative 
defense, by presenting a record that shows there is no willful or unprovoked 
physical aggression." (2nd Tr., 26:1-3.) More correctly, the Court prefaced this 
statement as follows: 
I think the clear law in Kearney is the burden of proof is on the 
plaintiff to bring their facts within the exception, to put forth evidence 
that shows that the death was proximally caused by unprovoked 
physical aggression of the employer. 
The MSHA administrative district judge, although I don't believe I'm 
bound by that person's findings, did not get to a willful act, did not get 
to any physical aggression. 
Even if the Court were to entertain the plaintiffs' motion or the 
plaintiffs' position that the burden initially is on the defense to 
establish a prima facie case of its affirmative defense on the facts at 
bar, the things I can consider in this case, I can get to negligence, I can 
get to maybe some sort of aggravated negligence, but I can't get beyond 
negligence. There just aren't facts that bring this case within the 
exception. 
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. Tr. 25:6-25:24)(emphases added). Here, the District Court continued to 
improperly place the burden on the Mareks on summary judgment. Indeed, 1n 
musing how Heda's evidence might meet an initial burden, the District Court then 
failed to discuss the Mareks' opposing evidence - evidence which the Court had 
already recognized as "disputed facts." (C.R. 973.) 
b. The Mareks were acting appropriately within their scope of 
work. 
Hecla also asserts that the District Court correctly held that the scope of 
work assignment for the Mareks was "irrelevant." (Respondents' Brief at 33.) In 
particular, the District Court focused on the question of "was there express direction 
to go in there which amounted to willful or unprovoked physical aggression" as the 
"test." (2nd Tr., 11. 26:13-19.) The District Court explained, more fully: 
With regard to the argument by the plaintiffs that the general duty 
assignment to that stope was sufficient to constitute an authorization 
that they be in there watering the muck, I think that's true, but 
that's not the test. As Mr. Ramsden points out, was there express 
direction to go in there which amounted to willful or unprovoked 
physical aggression? 
(Jd.)(emphasis added). The District Court also summarized what it considered the 
key facts of the Dominguez case: 
The physical aggression was, get in there and clean the cyanide, 
knowing of the violations, meeting the protests of the employees, with 
just ignoring the requirements for respirators and safety gear. That's 
why that case had so many decisions and so many forums. It was just 
very, very egregious conduct. 
(2nd Tr., 11. 26:6-12.) Each of those key facts highlighted by the District Court echo 
the facts of this case: 
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• "[G]et in there and clean the cyanide"21 As above, the District Court 
indicated that "I think that's true" that "the general duty assignment to that 
stope was sufficient to constitute an authorization that they be in there 
watering the muck" - in an area that without engineering review, without 
safety review, without ground control, and in violation of federal mining laws. 
• "[K]nowing of the violations"22 -Again, as above, the violations involved were 
"mandatory standard[s]" (C.R. 408-413), the violations for which were 
deemed "unwarrantable" by l\t[SHA. (Id.) 
• "[M]eeting the protests of the employees" - Testimony provided in deposition 
demonstrated that Hecla received multiple warnings about the stope from a 
production geologist and a "Sugar Daddy" miner. (C.R. 242-243, 11. 151:15-
152:24; 244-245, 11. 153:6-155:4; 402-407; 572, 11. 13:5-14:24; & 602-603, 11. 
132:4-135:3.) 
• "[W]ith just ignoring the requirements for respirators and safety gear." -And 
here, the requirements ignored related to ground control, and in particular, 
that it "was not designed, installed and/or maintained in a manner that was 
capable of supporting the ground in such a wide stope when the support 
pillar was removed." (C.R. 408 & 412.) 
Thus, especially in light of the Dominguez decision, the District Court erred 1n 
concluding that the scope of work question was irrelevant. 
C. Heda's hearsay argument as to the MSHA Decision fails. 
Finally, Hecla asserts both that the District Court appropriately disregarded 
the MSHA Decision in light of Kearney and DeMoss, but also that the District Court 
found the MSHA Decision "inadmissible hearsay." (Respondents' Brief, at 34.) As 
21 More correctly, "Dominguez alleges Elias knew it was hazardous to enter the steel 
tank, but concealed that knowledge from Dominguez." Dominguez, 142 Idaho at 9. 
22 Elias, the employer in the Dominguez case, was convicted of violations of the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, where "the indictment charged that Elias 
had stored or disposed of hazardous waste without a permit, knowing that his 
actions placed others in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury[.]" 
United States v. Elias, 269 F.3d at 1008. As above, the mens rea element of the 
offense did not require proof that Elias "actually intended to harm or endanger any 
person." Id. at 1018. 
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to the first issue, as discussed above, the District Court erred in not recognizing 
that the MSHA Decision outlined the kind of conduct warned of by Justice Huntley 
an_d otherwise punished in Dominguez. 
As to the hearsay issue, to the contrary, no such hearsay ruling was made; in 
fact, the District Court's oral decision is devoid of any reference to hearsay.23 (2nd 
Tr., 11. 24:21-28:7.) Further, Heda's opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration 
contains no hearsay objection to the MSHA Decision (R. Adden., 44-45), nor was any 
such objection raised by Hecla at hearing. (2nd Tr., 11. 20:15-24:15.) Hearsay 
objections made for the first time on appeal are not properly before the Court and 
"will not be considered." Viehweg v. Thompson, 103 Idaho 265, 271 (Ct. App. 
1982).24 Accordingly, Heda's argument on this point fails. 
23 This argument appears to be based on the Court's fleeting comment that 
"although I don't believe I'm bound by that person's findings [the "MSHA 
administrative district judge"] .... " [2nd Tr., 11. 25:13-14.] This appears to be only 
passing commentary on potential preclusion issues, as the District Court ultimately 
did. make discussion of the MSHA decision findings. As an aside, Idaho allows for 
res judicata (both issue and claim preclusion) to apply with respect to 
administrative determinations. See J &J Contractors v. Idaho Transp. Bd., 118 
Idaho 535, 537, 797 P.2d 1383, 1385 (1990); Transport Truck & Trailer Inc. v. 
Freightliner, LLC, 368 Fed. Appx. 786, at *1 (9th Cir. 2010)(unpublished). 
24 In any event, other courts have found MSHA evidence to be admissible. See, e.g., 
Kennedy v. Joy Techs., Inc., 269 F. App'x 302, 310-11 (4th Cir. 2008)(unpublished); 
Lupardus v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, No. CIV.A. 2:06-CV-00661, 2007 WL 2156606, at 
*3 (S.D.W. Va. July 26, 2007); Smith v. Atl. Richfield Co., 814 F.2d 1481, 1486 (10th 
Cir. 1987). Moreover, under I.RE. 803(8), the MSHA Decision would not be a 
"special investigation," because MSHA is required by law to investigate and control 
every such incident, and, in conjunction therewith, provide such information to state 
agencies and the public, per 30 U.S.C. § 819(b). Compare with Jeremiah v. Yanke 
Mach. Shop, Inc., 131 Idaho 242, 247, 953 P.2d 992, 997 (1998)(contrasting 
admissibility of medication distribution chart required by Federal Drug 
Administration versus Idaho Human Rights Commission determination of a 
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For these reasons, the District Court's denial of the Marek's Motion for 
Reconsideration should be reversed. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the April 21, 2015, decision of the District 
Court granting summary judgment to Hecla, and, in turn, denying the Mareks' 
motion for summary judgment, as well as the District Court's September 3, 2015, 
denial of the Mareks' motion for reconsideration, should be reversed and remanded 
to the District Court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 
' By-;;-~-+~-+--v'7""'-+~~~ 
"particular complaint" "not submitted to any other federal or state agency pursuant 
to a duty imposed by law."). 
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